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ASKING “WHY” AND “HOW”:  
A HISTORICAL TURN IN REFUGEE 
EDUCATION RESEARCH
Christine Monaghan
ABSTRACT
History has much to offer education in emergencies scholars and practitioners. 
Most research in this field comprises qualitative case studies and, to a lesser extent, 
quantitative experimental studies, both of which tend to focus on either the impact 
of interventions or whether education processes or structures are a cause or effect 
of conflict. I argue that historical approaches enable researchers to ask different 
questions, to construct a narrative that establishes why specific policies and programs 
for refugee education were developed by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees or in particular refugee camps or settlements, and to determine why 
and how the field has changed over time. This enables the researcher to consider 
why and how policy and programmatic changes often have not brought lasting 
change to the challenges of refugee education, and to critically consider what future 
changes might be possible. In this article, I make the case for a turn to historical 
approaches in refugee education research by providing an example of how I used 
historical methods to reconstruct the education narrative of Kenya’s Dadaab and 
Kakuma refugee camps. 
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing amount of research on education in countries affected by 
armed conflict, but few studies focus specifically on refugee education. Most of 
the existing refugee education literature is comprised of qualitative case studies 
conducted by scholars or analytic reports commissioned by United Nations (UN) 
agencies or international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). These studies 
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and reports predominately explore “what” rather than “why” or “how” questions, 
as they describe a range of education interventions (e.g., peace education, non-
formal vocational education); the number of refugees enrolled in schools in camps, 
settlements, or urban areas; student-teacher ratios; annual per-pupil expenditures; 
and opportunities for refugees to access secondary or higher education. They then 
situate these issues within certain practical or conceptual constraints. 
“What” questions of course are important, as they can help policy-makers 
determine whether certain education policies or programs work. This knowledge 
is critical in determining how to direct the scarce resources available in refugee 
contexts most effectively, as need almost always exceeds supply. However, I 
suggest that “why” and “how” questions are of equal, if not greater, significance 
to this same agenda. Asking why and how as well as what enables researchers 
to reconstruct a historical narrative that establishes why specific policies and 
programs were implemented in particular refugee camps or settlements and why 
some were not, why and how the field has changed over time and what forces 
were behind these changes, and why and how policy and programmatic changes 
often have not brought lasting change to the challenges of refugee education. 
In this article, I make a case for a turn to historical approaches in refugee education 
research by providing an example of how I used historical methods to reconstruct 
the education narrative of Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. I argue 
that taking such a turn could shed light on three interrelated areas in ways other 
methods fail to do. First, these methods use deep contextual and contemporaneous 
data that help to explain persistent challenges in education in and across refugee 
contexts, including low enrollment rates, high rates of student attrition, high 
student-teacher ratios, and consistently low education funding from the wider 
pool of humanitarian aid.1 They also can increase our knowledge of why an array 
of policies and programs for refugee education have not effectively addressed 
these challenges and help to reveal what broader changes might be necessary to 
ensure better outcomes. Lastly, historical narratives can reveal puzzles inherent 
in refugee education that continually confront UN agencies, primarily the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the agency mandated to 
protect and assist refugees, and the community services and education officers 
in its employ. 
1  That is, 39 percent of primary school aged refugees remain out of school worldwide; United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Turn the Tide: Refugee Education in Crisis,” Division of 
International Protection, 2018, 13, http://www.unhcr.org/5b852f8e4.pdf. 
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I historicize and contextualize refugee education in the post-Cold War era 
by reviewing and integrating education in emergencies (EiE), international 
development studies on education, and the UNHCR literature, and initiate a 
mutually beneficial cross-disciplinary dialogue among them. Most of the studies 
included point to the many practical and conceptual constraints of refugee 
education. In reviewing these distinct literatures, I aim to identify some of the 
remaining gaps, particularly how broad ideas about global education policy and 
EiE were shaped from “above” (i.e., by UN agencies and INGOs) and “below” 
(i.e., by refugees). I suggest that narrative reconstruction can help to address these 
gaps, and I discuss specific historical methods, including oral history, archival 
research, and narrative, that I used to this end in a separate historical study.2 I 
demonstrate the application of these methods by reconstructing the education 
histories of Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, from their founding 
in 1992 up to 1997. Reconstructing the history of these refugee camps beyond 
education is important, as so few such studies exist. Despite the rise of global and 
transnational histories, the discipline of history, like the institution of education, 
is a state-centric enterprise.3 As such, transnational spaces such as refugee camps 
are without documented history, despite some of them having hosted refugees for 
decades.4 For example, there is no dedicated archive for the Dadaab or the Kakuma 
camp, only ad-hoc records kept at the UNHCR archive in Geneva, Switzerland. 
I conclude this article by discussing why and how education policies were 
developed, implemented, and changed over this five-year period in both camps 
and at UNHCR headquarters, and why and how, despite these changes, challenges 
in refugee education have persisted.
BRIDGING THE GAP
Education in Emergencies
Although refugee education is foundational to the EiE field, historical methods have 
rarely been used to understand it. In 1999 and 2000, a handful of practitioners who 
had worked in refugee camps throughout the world gathered with practitioners 
2 Christine Monaghan, Educating for Durable Solutions? Histories of Schooling in Kenya’s Dadaab and 
Kakuma Refugee Camps (London: Bloomsbury Press, forthcoming). 
3 See Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-
State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,” Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 301-34, https://doi.
org/10.1111/1471-0374.00043. 
4 Amy K. Levin, ed., Global Mobilities: Refugees, Exiles, and Immigrants in Museums and Archives (New 
York: Routledge, 2016).
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who had worked in conflict and postconflict settings to establish what would 
become the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies. Also in 2000, 
at a strategy session held at the second Education For All (EFA) Forum in Dakar, 
Senegal, participants concluded that multiple emergencies occurring throughout 
the 1990s (e.g., intrastate wars throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, and 
Central and Southeast Asia) had significantly impeded the realization of universal 
basic education for all—a global policy priority set forth ten years earlier at the first 
World Conference on Education For All in Jomtien, Thailand. EiE thus became 
central to achieving EFA—a claim that education and community services officers 
employed by UNHCR, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (the 
three UN agencies providing education in emergency situations) could and did 
call on when advocating for education to be included in emergency responses.5 
However, to justify their requests, these officers sought out studies that focused 
narrowly on education policies or programs, rather than studies that critiqued 
the agencies developing policy or implementing programs, or that explored the 
challenges of refugee education programming.6 A subsequent wave of critical 
and empirical research offered different understandings of education, including 
the fact that it was far from protective and in many cases had contributed to 
or exacerbated conflicts.7 Although it was apparent that new theoretical and 
5 See Pilar Aguilar and Gonzalo Retamal, “Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: 
A Discussion Document,” UNICEF, 1998; see also Mary Joy Pigozzi, “Education in Emergencies and for 
Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach,” UNICEF, 1999.
6 See Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn, “The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict,” 
Network Paper, Humanitarian Practice Network 42, 2003, 1-36; Margaret Sinclair, Planning Education in and 
after Emergencies (Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2002); Marc Sommers, 
The Education Imperative: Supporting Education in Emergencies (Washington, DC: Academy for Educational 
Development, and New York: Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2003) 
7 See Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli, “The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a 
Peace-Building Approach to Education,” UNICEF Innocenti Center, 2000; see also Dana Burde, Schools for 
Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Lynn Davies, Education 
and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos (New York: Routledge, 2003); Lynn Davies, “Schools and War: Urgent 
Agendas for Comparative and International Education,” Compare 35, no. 4 (2005): 357-71, https://doi.
org/10.1080/03057920500331561; Lynn Davies, “Educating against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicisation 
of Young People,” International Review of Education 55, nos. 2-3 (2009): 183-203, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-
008-9126-8; Lynn Davies, and Christopher Talbot, “Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts,” Comparative 
Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 509-18, https://doi.org/10.1086/591295; Tony Gallagher, Education in Divided 
Societies (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Elisabeth King, From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jackie Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” Globalisation, 
Societies and Education 5, no. 2 (2007): 181-200, https://doi.org/10.1080/14767720701425776; Mieke T. A. Lopes 
Cardozo, “Sri Lanka: In Peace or in Pieces? A Critical Approach to Peace Education in Sri Lanka,” Research 
in Comparative and International Education 3, no. 1 (2008): 19-35, https://doi.org/10.2304/rcie.2008.3.1.19; 
Tejendra J. Pherali, “Education and Conflict in Nepal: Possibilities for Reconstruction,” Globalisation, Societies 
and Education 9, no. 1 (2011): 135-54, https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2010.513590; Ritesh Shah, “Goodbye 
Conflict, Hello Development? Curriculum Reform in Timor-Leste,” International Journal of Educational 
Development 32, no. 1 (2012): 31-38, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2011.04.005; Alan Smith, “Education in 
the Twenty‐First Century: Conflict, Reconstruction and Reconciliation 1,” Compare 35, no. 4 (2005): 373-91, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03057920500331397; Alan Smith, and Tony Vaux, “Education, Conflict and International 
Development,” UK Department for International Development, 2003.
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methodological approaches were needed to explain the complex and dynamic 
relationship between education and conflict, the resultant research focused little 
on refugee education.8
However, a few studies did describe and analyze specific challenges in the content, 
structure, and provisioning of education in refugee camps. They highlighted, for 
example, the fact that non-state actors (i.e., UNHCR) face challenges in selecting 
curricula and pedagogical approaches, particularly because the traditional purposes 
of schooling, such as the cultivation of citizenship and economic development, 
simply do not exist in refugee camps.9 Waters and LeBlanc, commenting on the 
statelessness of refugees, note that refugees are by definition “outside both the 
modern economy and modern society.” As a result, “creating education systems 
for refugees is always embedded in this paradox, which is the root cause of why 
it is difficult to implement or . . . to ‘imagine’ such programs.”10
Drawing from ethnographic research conducted in refugee camps in Thailand, 
Banki clearly articulates one of the central challenges of refugee education:
In the context of education the lack of incentives stems from the 
uncertainty of the resolution of protracted refugee situations, 
making it difficult to develop original and creative ways to 
think about what students should learn and how they might put 
it to use in the future. Simply put, neither external education 
planners nor refugees themselves (as students or planners) 
know where they will be in the future, making systemic and 
curriculum design very difficult.11 
Banki’s ethnographic approach, which is similar to the descriptive case studies 
widely used in EiE scholarship, asks and answers “what” questions through 
detailed descriptive analysis. For example, Banki concludes her analysis by 
stating that, “over the course of protracted refugee situations, education is shaped 
8  See Mario Novelli and Mieke T. A. Lopes Cardozo, “Conflict, Education and the Global South: New 
Critical Directions,” International Journal of Educational Development 28, no. 4 (2008): 473-88, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2008.01.004; see also Dana Burde, “Assessing Impact and Bridging Methodological 
Divides: Randomized Trials in Countries Affected by Conflict,” Comparative Education Review 56, no. 3 
(2012): 448-73, https://doi.org/10.1086/664991. 
9  Tony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, “Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation‐
State,” Comparative Education Review 49, no. 2 (2005): 129-47, https://doi.org/10.2307/3542160.
10  Waters and LeBlanc, “Refugees and Education,” 140. 
11  Susan Banki, “Refugee Camp Education: Populations Left Behind,” in Refugees, Immigrants, and 
Education in the Global South: Lives in Motion, eds. Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 133-48.
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by negotiations among camp administrators, humanitarian agencies, the host 
country, the international refugee regime, and refugees.”12 Yet, her ethnography 
does not reveal what those negotiations were, why and how they took shape, and 
what changes did (or did not) occur in refugee education as a result.
Finally, an in-depth case study of the education programming provided to 
refugees in seven camps along the Thai-Burmese border, including the challenges, 
notes that UNHCR and its partner INGOs made fraught policy choices about 
the curriculum and language of instruction, which facilitated the inclusion or 
caused the exclusion of a large number of school-aged children in the camps.13 For 
example, the Burmese curriculum they chose was taught in a particular dialect 
of the Karen language that many refugees didn’t know. They also did not provide 
special education programming for disabled refugee children, which left many of 
them without access to formal schooling. While this study illustrates some of the 
nuances and complexities of refugee education in camp settings, it sheds no light 
on why or how UNHCR and its partner INGOs made these particular decisions. 
A brief study conducted by the same scholars at the same sites examined changes 
in the education provided over the 20 years since the camps were founded.14 They 
concluded that, “after years of trial, error, and practice, educational services are 
now provided in a relatively effective and efficient manner.”15 However, they did 
not examine what those changes were or how and why they came about, thus the 
mechanisms and processes that accounted for these changes remain unknown. 
In contrast to the work described above, Dryden-Peterson periodizes key shifts 
in the purposes and provision of refugee education from World War II to 2016. 
Using her research in the UNHCR archives and key informant interviews 
she conducted with UNHCR and UNICEF policy-makers, Dryden-Peterson 
examines “the tension between the global right to education for refugees and 
the local implementation of this right.”16 She concludes that, despite discursive 
and normative change over time, there is continuing tension because refugees 
“are both within and outside nation states.”17 Dryden-Peterson’s use of archival 
research helps to demonstrate the promise of using a historical approach to refugee 
12  Banki, “Populations Left Behind,” 139.
13  Su-Ann Oh and Marc van der Stouwe, “Education, Diversity, and Inclusion in Burmese Refugee Camps 
in Thailand,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 589-617, https://doi.org/10.1086/591299.
14  Marc van der Stouwe and Su-Ann Oh, “Educational Change in a Protracted Refugee Context,” Forced 
Migration Review 30 (2008): 47-49.
15  Van der Stouwe and Oh, “Educational Change,” 47-48.
16  Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “Refugee Education: The Crossroads of Globalization,” Educational Researcher 
45, no. 9 (2016): 473-82, 476, https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189x16683398. 
17  Dryden-Peterson, “Refugee Education,” 479. 
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education research. This approach includes identifying persistent institutional and 
ideational tensions and areas of further inquiry that would provide contemporary 
historical examples of when and how UN agencies and national governments 
negotiated “age-old tensions between the sovereignty of the nation-state and global 
responsibility (e.g., banning of chemical weapons, the landmine treaty).”18 In the 
section below, I employ similar historical methods to illuminate new dimensions 
of social phenomena that previously have been hidden from view. 
UNHCR 
Almost three decades ago, at the end of the Cold War, many refugee camps were 
rapidly established throughout the world in response to a large influx of new 
refugees. The quest to find answers to questions about what to teach, to whom, and 
for how long was contentious and contingent, and it differed from one camp to 
the next, due to community services officers’ and refugees’ particular interests and 
initiatives, and to the ways policy-makers capitalized on opportunities to establish 
or reshape education policy in humanitarian contexts at key moments (e.g., The 
World Education Forum in 2000). Understanding and explaining how these 
questions were answered in specific camps over time, in this case Dadaab and 
Kakuma, and why documents, tools, and frameworks were developed in particular 
ways can help clarify the inherent institutional and ideational challenges that 
continue to confound UNHCR’s education programming in refugee contexts. 
In this article, I focus on UNHCR rather than on other UN agencies such as 
UNICEF or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East (UNRWA) because UNHCR was the primary developer of refugee 
education policy during the period surveyed (1992-1997).19 Moreover, UNHCR 
and its INGO partners implemented education programming for refugees in 
most camps and informal settlements throughout the world.20 
18  Dryden-Peterson, “Refugee Education,” 479.
19  For additional detail, see Monaghan, Educating for Durable Solutions? 
20  UNRWA also has a long history of developing and implementing education for Palestinian refugees. 
See Husein Abdul-Hamid, Harry Patrinos, Joel Reyes et al., “Learning in the Face of Adversity: The UNRWA 
Education Program for Palestine Refugees,” The World Bank, 2015; Ghassan Shabaneh, “Education and 
Identity: The Role of UNRWA’s Education Programmes in the Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 4 (2012): 491-513, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fer055; SabaArafat, “Formal 
Education in UNRWA,” Journal of Refugee Studies 2, no. 1 (1989): 108-12; JalalAl-Husseini, “UNRWA 
and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process,” Journal of Palestine Studies 29, no. 2 (2000): 51-64, https://
doi.org/10.1525/jps.2000.29.2.02p0030x; Maya Rosenfeld, “From Emergency Relief Assistance to Human 
Development and Back: UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2009,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28, 
nos. 2-3 (2009): 286-317, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdp038.
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UNHCR’s founding statute stipulates that all of its operational costs, which are 
98 percent of its total budget, must be funded by bilateral organizations or the 
private sector (e.g., corporations, philanthropic organizations, or individuals) 
for discrete, one-year funding cycles.21 Thus, funding for refugee education is 
dependent on donor states (e.g., the United States, Norway, Sweden) or private 
organizations, which historically have tended to view refugee education as a non-
essential need. Additionally, under UNHCR’s founding mandate, three durable 
solutions are available to refugees: third country resettlement, local integration, or 
repatriation to their country of origin.22 Yet, for almost 30 years, while protracted 
conflicts have become the norm, third-country resettlement and local integration 
into host countries have been significantly restricted. 
Throughout the 1990s, chronic or recurrent intrastate conflicts resulted in the 
establishment of long-term refugee camps. In these protracted refugee situations, 
UNHCR came to operate as a surrogate state with minimal or no oversight or 
assistance provided by host states.23 The average length of stay in a camp is now 
17 years; during this time, most refugees are restricted from seeking wage-
earning employment or moving freely outside the camps.24 As a result, the three 
durable solutions have limited viability. Nevertheless, UNHCR continues to frame 
education as both a durable solution and critical to achieving durable solutions.25 
Critically engaging with why and how this is so could reveal what broader changes 
might be needed to ensure better education outcomes.
In the 2000s, faced with a growing number of responsibilities, a large increase in 
the number of refugees under its care and protection, and challenges in funding 
its operations, UNHCR began to reframe the significance and scope of its work. 
Protracted refugee situations were increasingly presented as urgent matters of 
international peace and security, and UNHCR successfully situated refugee 
movements as central elements of numerous UN Security Council resolutions.26 
“Education for repatriation” and “education for durable solutions” were terms 
devised by a handful of UNHCR program officers in response to host states’ 
21  See Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts, and James Milner, UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee 
Protection into the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2008).
22  See Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” 
International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 33-56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2001.tb00003.x.
23  Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, “A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations,” 
UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009.
24  See Slaughter and Crisp, “A Surrogate State?”
25  UNHCR, “Education Strategy 2012-2016,” Division of International Protection, 2012, 7, http://www.
unhcr.org/5149ba349.html.
26  See Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher, and James Milner, UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee 
Protection (New York: Routledge, 2013).
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increasingly restrictive asylum policies and threats of refoulement.27 On the one 
hand, framing education in these ways highlighted its role as a protective, life-
saving service and thus progressively aligned the provision of education services 
with UNHCR’s core mandate. On the other hand, the education policies and 
programs implemented in camps under the guise of “education for repatriation” 
have seldom aligned with the needs of refugees trapped in protracted situations, 
particularly those (numbering in the millions) for whom “the end of their exile 
is nowhere in sight.”28 
UNHCR scholarship provides a historical context for why and how the agency 
has come to operate as a surrogate state. It also describes the constraints it 
faces in doing so because of the ways states continue to control the scope of 
UNHCR’s work as a non-state actor in transnational spaces. These constraints 
are particularly evident when considering the conceptual and practical challenges 
of providing education to refugees in protracted crisis situations. They include a 
one-year funding cycle, while the provision of education services requires multi-
year commitments; sustained questions at UNHCR of whether and how education 
aligns with the institution’s mandate; and answers from those endeavoring to 
show the ways it does so, such as “education for repatriation,” that have lasting 
implications for the education services provided in camps. The fact that historical 
analyses of UNHCR have been reconstructed primarily using UNHCR archival 
documents and have not included the lived experiences of those residing in the 
camps it manages is a notable gap this paper seeks to address. 
When considered collectively, descriptive case studies, ethnographies, and 
institutional histories reveal the numerous interrelated challenges of providing 
refugee education in protracted situations. These include the ways states constrain 
UNHCR from functioning effectively as a surrogate state; how attempts to loosen 
these constraints (e.g., reframing the scope of its work to focus on repatriation and 
security) have in turn shaped and constrained UNHCR’s provision of education 
services in camps (e.g., education for repatriation); how, via EFA, basic education 
became a global policy priority considered central to state- and nation-building 
in the concomitant eras of globalization and the post-Cold War; and the fact that 
education is necessary for wholly different purposes in the transnational spaces of 
refugee camps. What these accounts do not reveal but historical reconstruction 
can make known is how different actors at different moments in time endeavored 
to navigate and change some of these challenges, why they were successful in some 
27  See Betts et al., Politics and Practice. 
28  Gil Loescher and James Milner, “Understanding the Challenge,” Forced Migration Review 33 (2009): 
9-11, 37. 
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cases, how changes to global refugee education policies did or did not impact 
education programming in camps, and vice versa. Such knowledge is significant 
for current and future policy-makers and program officers as they consider how 
to develop and implement policies and programs for refugee education that will 
be beset by fewer challenges and better able to serve refugees’ educational needs.
FROM EMERGENCY EDUCATION TO  
EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES 
Methods
In the work presented below and the study this article is based on, I asked and 
answered three interrelated questions: (1) Why and how were education policies 
and programs developed, implemented, and changed in Kenya’s Dadaab and 
Kakuma camps? (2) What drove changes when they occurred? (3) How were the 
lived educational experiences of refugee students, their families, and teachers 
impacted by the range of education policies and programs implemented during 
the period from 1992 to 1997? Embedded in the above are additional questions 
about concrete schooling policies for refugees: (a) What curriculum and language 
of instruction should be used? (b) Who should teach? (c) How many grade levels 
should be offered? (d) How much funding should be allocated to education, 
relative to other services? (e) How might that funding be secured? I answered 
these questions by collecting oral histories from refugee teachers and students in 
Kakuma and Dadaab, conducting research at the UNHCR archives in Geneva, 
and interviewing current and former UNHCR policy-makers.
Oral history and archival research are particularly well-suited to making a 
historical turn in refugee education research. So, too, is the use of narrative to 
present data or findings, to document what happened over time, and to explain 
how and why. Of the historian’s tools, it is narrative that “reveals [sic] the meaning, 
coherence, or significance of events.”29 To historicize refugee education—that is, to 
interpret events as a product of historical development—is to contextualize these 
events as part of wider phenomena. This requires integrating separate literatures, 
including the EiE literature and international development studies in education, 
as well as the literature on UNHCR.
29  Hayden White, “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory,” History and Theory 
23, no. 1 (1984): 1-33, 30. 
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Oral Histories 
Oral history is “an in-depth account of personal experience and reflections.”30 
Recording traditional oral histories that focus on participants’ life experiences 
often takes several hours. My questions focused only on participants’ educational 
experiences in the camps, thus many of the interviews were significantly shorter; 
however, some participants did recount stories from their lives before Dadaab 
or Kakuma. I spent approximately one month in Kakuma, but only one week in 
Dadaab, due to security concerns.31 The interviews varied from fifteen minutes 
to more than four hours; the length depended on a variety of factors, including 
security at the interview site, the length of time participants had spent in the 
camps (generally, the longer the tenure, the longer the interview), and the amount 
of time participants were able to allocate for the interview (many were conducted 
during the school day). 
In Kakuma, I conducted oral histories with teachers, administrators, and students 
at all twenty-six primary schools, six secondary schools, the vocational school, and 
the higher education learning center. I conducted approximately eighty interviews 
with individuals and ten with groups of three to six people. I also conducted oral 
histories with the current education officers of UNHCR and the implementing 
partner for education, Lutheran World Federation. In Dadaab, I conducted oral 
histories with teachers, students, and administrators at primary and secondary 
schools and in vocational and higher education programs in each of the five 
sub-camps, and with education officers at all implementing partners involved in 
education service provision. In total, I gathered oral histories from 67 teachers, 
students, administrators, and education officers in Dadaab.
In Kakuma, I conducted four to six interviews per day at schools that were within 
a 10- to 15-minute ride by motorbike taxi, as the month I spent in the camp 
allowed for a leisurely pace and in some cases time for follow-up interviews. In 
Dadaab, given the limited time I had in the camp, I conducted about 15 interviews 
per day, beginning at 7 am and concluding after 7 pm. It took about 20 minutes 
to drive between sub-camps, but the schools I visited within the sub-camps were 
typically separated by less than one mile. In both camps, I generally began by 
30  “Principles and Best Practices,” Oral History Association, 2009, https://www.oralhistory.org/about/
principles-and-practices-revised-2009/.
31  In 2011, the group Al-Shabaab infiltrated Dadaab and has maintained a steady presence there since, 
detonating a number of bombs in heavily trafficked marketplaces and kidnapping or killing several aid 
workers. As a result, researchers, INGO staff members, and journalists are advised to limit the time they 
spend in the camp. 
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asking participants to describe their educational experiences in the camp schools 
as a student, teacher, or administrator. I also asked questions about changes to the 
curriculum, or to education programming more broadly, that they had witnessed 
over time. I tried to hone in on the precise dates of changes and on what and 
who caused them. I also asked participants about their educational aspirations. 
Finally, I conducted 20 oral histories, in person or by Skype, with current and 
former senior and mid-level UNHCR community service, education, protection, 
and program officers. These interviews lasted between one and six hours. I asked 
participants to describe significant moments they had witnessed or experienced 
that impacted or changed refugee education policies or programs, both in Kakuma 
or Dadaab and globally, as well as policies or programs that had been proposed 
and discussed but never implemented, and why they had not. 
Archival Research 
I spent three weeks in the UNHCR archives in Geneva reviewing approximately 
one thousand memorandums, policy briefings, mission reports, white papers, 
curricular materials, and meeting minutes. The majority of these had been 
drafted and circulated in the UNHCR Education Unit. However, more than two 
hundred documents came from the UNHCR Finance, Fundraising, and Executive 
Management Committee units, which offered insights into the internal workings 
of the UNHCR Headquarters (HQ), particularly where the Education Unit is 
situated relative to other units. In short, units are prioritized according to their 
relative relation to UNHCR’s core mandate: to protect. Between 1992 and 2012, 
the Education Unit was located within various units (e.g., Division of Program 
Support and Management; Division of Emergency, Security, and Supply; Division 
of International Protection); each move impacted UNHCR’s education policies 
and programs, particularly in terms of the financial and human resources devoted 
to education. 
Narrative
With hundreds of hours of interviews and thousands of pages of documents in 
hand, I proceeded to reconstruct the educational histories of both camps. I did 
so by chronologically ordering the events described in these documents and 
transcripts, reviewing and analyzing this chronology for emergent themes, and 
further coding and ordering the events within each year by one of seven emergent 
MONAGHAN
47December 2019
themes (e.g., idea-development in EiE, institutional change in UNHCR).32 Narrative 
strands quickly appeared as I considered developments at the UNHCR HQ in 
Geneva alongside those occurring at the same time in the Dadaab and Kakuma 
camps. For example, the publication in 1996 of Graça Machel’s seminal report, 
“The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,” also known as “The Machel Report,” 
led to a stream of funding for UNHCR that officers at UNHCR HQ used to pilot 
peace education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma.33 I determined whether to 
include or exclude particular events or to draw connections between them based 
on careful, critical sensitivity to the information gathered. It is the purview of 
historians to frame and reframe understandings of the past, and another historian 
might have made different interpretive choices that put a different relative onus 
on events or people.34 
In the following section, I reconstruct the education histories of Dadaab and 
Kakuma over the five-year period from 1992 to 1997. 
FINDINGS OF “EDUCATING FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS?”  
1992-1997
1992: The Founding of Kakuma and Dadaab
“I was not that big when I was in the army—I was still small,” Samuel recalled.35 
“In Sudan I had been an army officer with an SPLA [Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army] faction. Then I had a problem with my eyes because of operating a machine 
gun. So I was released for treatment with all of the minors who came here. That 
32  Historical analysis and narrative reconstruction are akin to mapping plot points in a story and 
connecting those points with exposition. Each historian or narrator will make sense of events differently. In 
reviewing and analyzing my master chronology comprised of data from archival research and oral interviews, 
I identified seven emergent themes that to me made sense in organizing my data and reconstructing a 
coherent narrative across place and time. The unit levels are as follows: (1) a broad idea related to state and 
non-state actors in the post-Cold War era; (2) a broad idea related to EiE; (3) an institutional feature related 
to UNHCR; (4) an institutional feature related to UNHCR’s Education Unit; (5) an institutional feature 
related to the UNHCR Nairobi Branch Office; (6) an institutional feature related to Dadaab camp; and (7) 
an institutional feature of Kakuma camp. I had a master chronology of events that was not organized by 
theme, and a chronology of events within each theme. Doing so allowed me to look across institution, idea, 
and time to see, for example, how ideational developments in the field of EiE corresponded with institutional 
developments at UNHCR HQ and in Dadaab or Kakuma camp. 
33  Graça Machel, “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,” United Nations, 1996; UNHCR, Global 
Community Services/Education Workshop, October 26-November 1, 1997, 33. 
34  Carlo Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 
(1991): 79-92, https://doi.org/10.1086/448624.
35  Here and throughout the narrative, names and identifying details have been changed to protect the 
privacy of individuals.
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was until February 17th, 1992. There was nothing when we came here. It was bare 
without people. Without anything.” Samuel was one of 12,000 unaccompanied 
minors, mostly boys, transported by UNHCR from hastily established makeshift 
camps in the small town of Lokichogio, Kenya, to Kakuma refugee camp 90 
kilometers to the southeast, in Kenya’s Great Rift Valley. “Kakuma means ‘nowhere’ 
in Swahili,” a UNHCR program officer remarked. “And it was not so much a camp 
then, more a long, narrow expanse of land” between forks of the Tarach River. 
Some of the children had been orphaned during the Second Sudanese Civil War, 
an ongoing internecine conflict between the central government and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army—a rebel group seeking to establish an autonomous 
Southern Sudan.36 Others had been child soldiers who were forced or voluntarily 
conscripted into the SPLA. They had first walked more than one thousand miles 
east to refugee camps in Ethiopia in 1991, most of them fleeing conflict or escaping 
induction into the SPLA. When war broke out in Ethiopia later that same year, 
they walked another five hundred miles southwestward to Kenya, arriving in 
Lokichogio in early 1992. A few, like Samuel, had been released by the SPLA to 
seek medical treatment for injuries sustained while fighting. 
UNHCR was overwhelmed in 1992 with the arrival of an average of nine hundred 
refugees daily in Kenya.37 In a report submitted to UNHCR HQ in February, a 
UNHCR social services officer wrote the following:
While the number of refugees has increased tenfold, [UNHCR] 
staff and facilities have not increased with corresponding 
rapidity . . . Influxes into camps and the lack of food and 
water as well as other facilities have caused malnutrition and 
innumerable deaths. Lack of staff to coordinate and put things 
in place has compounded the problems. Inexperienced staff 
have been deployed with very few senior staff to supervise 
and give direction. Forgery of documents, alleged bribery, and 
corruption have increased difficulties.38 
By December of that year, more than 427,000 refugees were being hosted in twelve 
camps and four border sites, mainly in the semi-arid desert regions of Rift Valley, 
which borders Sudan, and the North Eastern Province, which borders Somalia. 
36  See J. Millard Burr, “Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 1983-1998,” 
in Conflict in the Nuba Mountains: From Genocide-by-Attrition to the Contemporary Crisis in Sudan, eds. 
Samuel Totten and Amanda Grzyb (New York: Routledge, 2015), 89-111.
37  UNHCR, “Kenya Information Bulletin,” UNHCR, 1993. 
38  Marie Lobo, “Kenya Social Services Mission January 20-February 16, 1992,” UNHCR, 1992, 4, 7. 
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The UNHCR officer’s report was primarily referring to Liboi and Ifo camps; 
both were established in 1991, and by the beginning of 1992 they were providing 
asylum to more than 50,000 Somali refugees, the majority of them women and 
children.39 Because of the comparative security offered further inland, UNHCR 
established two additional camps adjacent to Ifo in 1992—Hagadera in March and 
Dagahely in June.40 These three sub-camps camps comprised the Dadaab camp 
complex, which was designed to host approximately 90,000 people—just half the 
number of refugees UNHCR had registered by the end of the year.41 “It was ad 
hoc as more and more people came across and there was no thought given to 
the layout of the camp,” a former UNHCR community services officer recalled. 
“I think there was a failure reading the context . . . there was no indication that 
Somalia was a political situation that would be solved. There was every indication 
that this would be long term. And yet the planning was ‘let’s see what happens 
tomorrow.’ ” 
By mid-1992, it became clear to senior staff at the UNHCR Branch Office in 
Nairobi that the refugee situation in Kenya would require the mobilization of 
implementing partners to assist with camp management and the provision of basic 
services. In Dadaab, UNHCR contracted with Cooperative for Assistance and 
Relief Everywhere (CARE) to serve as the implementing partner for all services, 
and it partnered with a number of INGOs in Kakuma, including the International 
Rescue Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Rädda Barnen, the Swedish 
section of Save the Children International.42 
More than 50 percent of the refugee population in Dadaab and 70 percent in 
Kakuma were school-aged children.43 However, as a former UNHCR community 
services officer explained, “initially it was very much a focus on water, sanitation, 
and health . . . at that point there was very little attention to the education sector. 
It was much more ‘if there is time.’ ” Many within UNHCR viewed the provision 
of education services as a potential “pull factor”—that is, a service highly valued 
by refugees that was not widely accessible in Somalia or Sudan and thus might 
“pull” people into Kenya to seek asylum, even if there was no imminent threat 
to their life in their home countries.
39  Nyrovia Whande, “Kenya: An Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children, August 8-September 
7, 1991,” UNHCR, 1991.
40  UNHCR, “Kenya Information Bulletin,” 1993. 
41  UNHCR, “Kenya Information Bulletin,” 1993. 
42  CARE, International Rescue Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Save the Children International 
are humanitarian aid agencies that deliver a broad range of emergency and long-term relief international 
development projects in more than 90 countries throughout the world. 
43  Lobo, “Kenya Social Services Mission.”
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Meanwhile, others argued that refugees in the camps were demanding education 
and that educational activities “should be initiated as soon as possible.”44 This 
debate played out in a series of reports published by officers from the UNHCR 
Protection and Community Services units. One report recommended that 
“educational programs should be organized in the camps,” and noted that “the 
Branch Office [in Nairobi] is developing a comprehensive education system for the 
new caseload.”45 However, another report circulated three months later indicated 
that the Branch Office was supposedly “no longer contemplating the development 
of a comprehensive education program as had been stated in the cabled clearance 
of the program, but only to support those educational activities which had already 
been started.”46 These activities included a limited number of scholarships awarded 
to refugees so they could complete vocational higher ed training through the 
DAFI Program, which had been established earlier that year, and the distribution 
of reading materials in the camps.47
1992: Formal Education Programming 
The matter of education in the camps was not officially settled, but by May, CARE 
had begun converting a former UNHCR compound in Dadaab into a school; 
by July, International Relief and Rehabilitation Services (IRRES) was officially 
contracted to be the implementing partner for education in Kakuma.48 In both 
camps, refugees had already organized classes for school-aged children and were 
holding lessons each morning under acacia trees. The teachers were the refugees 
who had attained the highest level of education in their home countries. Al Nuur, 
one of the first teachers in Dadaab, recalled that “at the beginning it was one 
teacher to two hundred students—it was emergency education.”
1992: Choosing the Curriculum and Language of Instruction
When CARE and IRRES began to formalize education programming in the 
camps, questions of language of instruction and which curriculum to implement 
were discussed at length in a series of consultations with the refugee communities 
44  Lobo, “Kenya Social Services Mission,” 17. 
45  Kenneth Lutato, “Kenya Education Mission,” UNHCR, 1992, 14.
46  Nyrovia Whande, “Registration and Needs Assessment of Southern Sudanese Minors,” UNHCR, 
Program and Technical Support Section, 1992, 7. 
47  The Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund (DAFI) provides a limited number of 
scholarships that enable refugees to attend universities and polytechnic institutions. DAFI has distributed 
approximately 30 scholarships per year to refugees residing in Kenya since 1992. 
48  Whande, “Registration and Needs Assessment.”
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in Dadaab and Kakuma. UNHCR’s “1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance 
to Refugees,” developed and issued following the 1990 World Conference on 
Education For All, offered no clear answers.49 UNHCR’s previous policy guidelines 
for education, issued in 1988, focused heavily on post-primary education and 
outlined selection criteria for awarding scholarships to refugees to attend 
universities in countries of asylum.50 However, the “1992 Guidelines” departed 
significantly from the previous policy and emphasized implementing primary 
education. They noted further that, if the situation was thought to be temporary, 
the refugees’ home curriculum and language of instruction should be used to help 
facilitate repatriation. If the duration of asylum was expected to be longer, then a 
“mixed curriculum that faces both ways and incorporates lessons from refugees’ 
home and host countries should be utilized.” Finally, the “1992 Guidelines” 
recommended that, if the situation was long term, the host country’s national 
curriculum should be implemented.51 Thus, from a policy standpoint, the choice 
of curriculum and anticipated duration of exile were closely linked. 
Of course, no one knew for sure how long refugees would remain in the Dadaab 
and Kakuma camps and speculation varied. In Dadaab, leaders from the refugee 
community indicated to CARE that schools should follow a Somali curriculum 
and that the language of instruction should be a combination of Somali and 
English. In Kakuma, refugees advocated strongly for the Kenyan curriculum 
with English as the language of instruction. UNHCR consulted with the Kenyan 
ministry of education, but beyond stating that it would be easiest to acquire 
the Kenyan curriculum and that UNHCR would have to register the schools in 
Kenya if students were to receive certification of primary and secondary school 
completion, the ministry remained uninvolved. While community services officers 
considered possibilities for vocational education programming and accelerated 
learning courses in both camps, they were not widely supported in the Nairobi 
Branch Office, as these programs were not included in the “1992 Guidelines.” 
And so it was that CARE took up the task of acquiring curricular materials from 
Somalia, while IRRES ordered copies of the Kenyan curriculum. Ultimately, CARE 
was unable to get hold of the Somali curriculum and UNESCO was contracted 
to write a mixed curriculum, which covered grades one to four, using a handful 
of rescued Somali textbooks and inputs from Somali teachers. 
49  UNHCR, “1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees,” UNHCR, Program and Technical 
Support Section, 1992. 
50  UNHCR, “1988 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees,” UNHCR, Program and Technical 
Support Section, 1988. 
51  UNHCR, “1992 Guidelines,” 18.
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1992: Incentive Wages 
An education mission conducted in Dadaab and Kakuma by an officer from 
UNHCR HQ in May 1992, prior to the start of formal schooling activities, 
recommended that “the structures constructed to house schools be simple, 
temporary ones; that the teaching force for the camp schools be recruited from 
the refugee communities; and that ‘incentive wages’ rather than ‘salaries’ should 
be offered to encourage refugees to teach.”52 Regardless of their qualifications, all 
refugee teachers received the same “incentive” of 500 Ksh per month. Equivalent 
to US$15, incentive wages were the source of “a lot of conflict between the 
implementing partners and the refugees,” according to Abdulahi, a former refugee 
teacher in Dadaab. The “1992 Guidelines” stipulated that refugee teachers should 
be given “incentives” (in cash or in kind), not formal salaries, “since they receive 
relief assistance for helping their communities . . . also because of the constraints 
of humanitarian funding.”53 These twin rationales—that refugee teachers were not 
“real” teachers because they lacked formal certification and that they were not in 
need of “salaries” because their needs were met by UNHCR—were used time and 
again by UNHCR and implementing partner staff members when negotiating with 
refugees who regularly advocated for increases in pay. Reports indicating that 
low wages led to substantial teacher turnover also maintained that “the concept 
of salary should [nevertheless] be avoided since this leads to comparisons with 
home or host country levels . . . which is simply not sustainable.”54
In July and August, CARE and IRRES began five-day teacher-training courses 
that covered basic content, lesson planning, and behavior management. Formal 
schooling commenced in both camps in September in split-shift sessions—
morning and afternoon—to accommodate more learners; classes were still held 
under trees. In Dadaab, reports indicated that about a quarter of school-aged 
children residing in the camp enrolled in school, while in Kakuma the number 
was closer to half.55 Boys outnumbered girls in the schools in both camps “at least 
ten to one,” recalled Abdulahi. “Girls were generally prohibited from attending 
by parents who wanted them to remain in the home—there was a lot of cultural 
interference back then.” 
52  Lutato, “Kenya Education Mission,” 16. 
53  UNHCR, “1992 Guidelines,” 43.
54  Margaret Sinclair, “Education Mission to Tanzania and Kenya July 4-30,” UNHCR, Program and 
Technical Support Section, 1994, 8. 
55  Sinclair, “Education Mission,” 22. 
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1992: EFA and Primary Schooling
In Kakuma, many of the unaccompanied boys remained out of school to seek 
work, earning a couple of shillings for collecting firewood or transporting bags 
of food from distribution centers to refugees’ homes. “It was also a challenge 
because we had to support ourselves—we had no parents to cook meals or do 
any of the work of taking care of a household. We were just living together in 
groups of ten or so,” explained Samuel, the Sudanese refugee who had migrated 
to Kakuma seeking medical treatment for his eyes. While the majority of students 
were going to school for the first time, those who had previous access to education 
in their home countries had to decide whether to start over in lower primary 
school (grades 1-4) or forego schooling altogether, as upper primary (grades 5-8) 
and secondary school were not offered. Many chose not to enroll. 
That the schooling consisted solely of lower primary classes reflected “EFA goals, 
which emphasized basic primary education. So that’s what UNHCR offered—the 
absolute minimum,” a UNHCR community services officer explained. “Education 
was a box to check off on the form submitted to HQ. Primary education—
available? Tick. Yes. That’s it. And because it was an add-on, there were no UNHCR 
education officers. It fell to community services to liaise with the implementing 
partners. I fought for education, but I wasn’t an educationist.” CARE and IRRES 
also had limited experience with the provision and management of education 
services, “though CARE had an education officer looking after the running of 
education activities and there was some structure,” the same officer stated. Al 
Alrahman, an Islamic organization, also provided structured schooling in the 
form of madrassas (alternately called doksis) in Dadaab. Abdulahi explained that 
“they [doksis] had very good foundations—every student had school books and 
they offered a midday meal. This alone was enough to attract many children.” 
1993: Teacher Strikes 
In early 1993, CARE and IRRES had begun to distribute textbooks and notebooks 
to students, as well as construction materials, primarily wood posts and chicken 
wire, to parents who were taking charge of building the schools. “Early on the 
agencies asked parents to form parent teacher associations [PTAs] in Dadaab and 
school management committees in Kakuma to assist with building, maintenance, 
and other management issues,” explained Al Nuur. Abdulahi recalled that “these 
parent groups became very influential—they were the go-between from agencies 
to the community.” In Dadaab, parents held weekly meetings with teachers to 
review students’ progress and any issues teachers might be having. Incentive 
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wages were frequently discussed. In February, with parents’ support, teachers met 
with CARE to demand an increase in wages. When wages were not increased, 
the teachers went on strike. “This lasted for months—all schools closed down,” 
Abdulahi explained. “It completely paralyzed the school system. Most teachers 
and parents supported it, though as weeks turned into a month and then two, 
people started saying, ‘We have to get the kids back in school.’ And then the 
incentive wage was raised to 1500 Ksh.”
1994: Refugee Education Working Group and Change in 
Implementing Partners 
In January 1994, UNHCR’s Education Unit—comprised of the senior education 
officer and two assistants, as well as a DAFI scholarship officer—participated in 
a series of meetings over the course of four days with education officers from 
UNESCO. Given the number of conflicts and subsequent refugee crises that had 
occurred in the preceding years, it was decided that these two organizations, along 
with UNICEF, would revise a previously established UN/NGO Working Group 
on Refugee Education. Education officers from UNESCO and UNICEF were to 
meet every two months in Geneva with UNHCR’s senior education officer and 
make arrangements for joint activities in the field. In Dadaab, UNESCO assisted 
CARE with teacher training and continued printing and distributing copies of 
the mixed Somali curriculum they had previously written. 
UNESCO did not undertake similar operations in Kakuma, where reports 
indicated growing challenges with IRRES as the implementing partner for 
education. According to a UNHCR report,
[IRRES] have refused to share records with the Nairobi Branch 
Office that account for how education funds are being spent. 
They are running a program where there is a shortage of 
textbooks and blackboards, classes are being held only between 
8 am and 11 am, and new teachers are not receiving training. 
Finally, while [only] alleged, there are indications that IRRES 
has purposely burned down the warehouse storing textbooks 
and other supplies to cover up theft of materials that presumably 
were sold for profit in Loki or Lodwar.56
56  Sinclair, “Education Mission,” 10.
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In May of that year, IRRES was asked to cease its work in Kakuma and the 
Branch Office began considering possibilities for a new implementing partner for 
education.57 They decided on Rädda Barnen, Save the Children Sweden.
1994-1995: Building Education Infrastructure and Devising 
Minimum Standards
Under the new management of Rädda Barnen, the fall school term began in 
Kakuma with the distribution of new textbooks and the addition of teacher aides, 
and classes took place under newly constructed makutti structures—four poles 
arranged in a rectangle connected by plastic sheeting, with a roof made of palm 
fronds. Arrangements were made for students enrolled in the recently established 
Don Bosco vocational program to build desks and benches, and to assist with the 
construction of new classrooms. Meanwhile, PTAs in Dadaab had undertaken 
the construction of the more permanent makutti buildings, “even pouring 
cement floors in all the new schools for foundation and updating the schools 
previously built,” Al Nuur recalled. A handful of Kenyan national teachers were 
also hired in Kakuma to teach newly added upper primary (grades 5-8) courses, 
particularly Swahili, Kenya’s national language. “Swahili was disastrous for us,” 
Samuel recalled. “We had grown up speaking Arabic, had been studying in the 
camp in English, and now we had to learn Swahili, which was a real challenge.”
Despite incremental improvements across both camps in terms of education 
infrastructure, teacher training, and distribution of school materials, education 
funding remained precarious. Problems releasing funds from the Branch Office 
to the sub-offices in Dadaab and Kakuma were the result of a shortfall in funding 
that stemmed from “donor fatigue for Somalia as well as the shifting of funding 
priorities towards Central Africa to more than one million Rwandese refugees,” 
detailed an end-of-year review of Kenya’s operations.58 “The Rwandan genocide 
and resulting refugee crisis in Zaire changed the whole humanitarian field, 
including emergency education,” remarked an implementing partner program 
officer. “Inside the UNHCR, there was serious dialogue about what emergency 
operations were and were not doing; 40,000 people had died of cholera in the 
camps for Rwandese refugees in the first month. There was a real push for 
minimum standards in all sectors.” 
57  Sinclair, “Education Mission,” 11.
58  UNHCR, “Kenya Information Bulletin,” UNHCR, 1995, 6. 
ASKING “WHY” AND “HOW”
Journal on Education in Emergencies56
In the education sector, a handful of unofficial minimum standards were introduced 
in early 1995 as the “Revised Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees,” 
which replaced the “1992 Guidelines.”59 In the “1995 Guidelines,” a class size of no 
more than 40 was recommended, as was offering refugee teachers a basic incentive 
wage that would help to ensure the sustainability of programming.60 Additionally, 
all education programs were to receive at the minimum a temporary shelter, 
writing materials, and blackboards. Increasing importance was also placed on 
using refugee education to meet “psychosocial needs after trauma and to convey 
life-saving skills for survival, including landmine awareness, peace education, 
and environmental awareness.”61 Like the “1992 Guidelines,” the updated version 
recommended that the curricula offered in camp schools match the “durable 
solution” deemed most viable (i.e., curriculum of the home country for temporary 
asylum, mixed curriculum for medium term, and curriculum of the host country 
for long-term situations).62
1995-1996: Changes to the Curriculum and  
Including Education in Community Services 
In Dadaab, refugees as well as UNHCR and partner staff members were 
increasingly coming to view the situation as long term. “PTAs had begun 
discussing the implementation of the Kenyan curriculum in the camp schools,” 
Al Nuur explained. “Some parents said their children would never go home and 
they needed to be able to sit for the Kenyan national exams that might lead to 
opportunities for secondary schooling. Other parents argued that Somali history 
and culture would be lost.” In a series of subsequent meetings with CARE, it 
was decided that children in lower primary grades would still use the UNESCO 
mixed curriculum and receive instruction in Somali, while those in upper primary 
would use the Kenyan curriculum taught in English and Swahili. Implementation 
was gradual; it began with the hiring of a handful of Kenyan national teachers 
and in-service training provided by CARE and UNESCO for current teachers.
A regional education workshop held in Nairobi in March had recommended that, 
“in large education programs [such as Dadaab and Kakuma], the job description 
for community services officers should clearly outline education functions and in 
59  UNHCR, “Revised Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees,” UNHCR, Program and 
Technical Support Section, 1995.
60  UNHCR, “Revised Guidelines,” 1995, 8. 
61  UNHCR, “Revised Guidelines,” 1995, 11.
62  UNHCR, “Revised Guidelines,” 1995, 15. 
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addition the position title should be ‘Community Services/Education Officer.’”63 
As a former UNHCR program officer explained, “while education had fallen to 
Community Services for a long time, there was no real incentive for Community 
Services to focus on education in addition to all of the other things they were 
tasked with. So education had to become part of what people were hired to do 
and what they were held accountable for.” While this recommendation was not 
incorporated by the Branch Office that year, a CARE community services officer 
took up a post as education officer in Dadaab in 1996, “which forged a strong link 
between community services and education,” stated Matthew, a former teacher 
writing his own history of education in Dadaab camp. He explained that 
the “can schools” are an example of why this link was 
important. We needed more schools built but we didn’t have 
the materials. However, there was a community services officer 
who had a stock of USAID tins and told the education officer 
he could use them if he wanted. So the education officer met 
with parents and they came up with a plan to cut the tins and 
hammer them flat so they could be used as sheeting for school 
walls. CARE provided some timber, so all the new schools were 
made of USAID cans and many of the mukatti schools were 
eventually replaced by the can schools as well.
1996-1997: Child Protection and Peace Education
In July 1996, at a global representatives meeting held at UNHCR HQ, participants 
from UNHCR, UNESCO, UNICEF, and a number of other INGOs reflected on 
the nature of humanitarian work in the post-Cold War era. The resulting report 
signaled a decisive shift from the early 1990s regarding the scope of UNHCR’s 
operations, concluding that “the initial euphoria generated by the end of the Cold 
War has dissipated and given way to a more sober appreciation of constraints 
imposed upon multilateral action: a lack of consensus regarding the protection of 
civilians in countries affected by armed conflict and the limited capacity of UNHCR 
in relation to the responsibilities it has been asked to assume.”64 One month later, 
UNICEF published “The Machel Report.”65 Examining the ways children and 
youth had been mobilized, sensitized, and traumatized across multiple conflicts 
in the five years since the end of the Cold War (e.g., the Bosnia and Yugoslav wars, 
Rwanda), the report concluded that international organizations must undertake 
63  Dominique Rabiller, “Revised Guidelines,” UNCHR, Regional Education Workshop, 1995, 12.
64  UNHCR, “Global Representatives Meeting Report,” UNHCR, 1996, 3.
65  Machel, “Impact of Armed Conflict.”
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activities that strengthen the protection of children and youth. The report also 
identified education as a primary protective activity in conflict-affected states 
and in refugee camps, and “advanced the notion that child protection was a core 
responsibility of the UNHCR,” an education officer explained. 
In the first months of 1997, in response to “The Machel Report,” UNHCR set 
up a Children’s Trust Fund administered by the senior coordinator for refugee 
children. “The coordinator, who saw education as a fundamental right for children, 
suddenly had more of an impact because there was funding behind the post,” a 
former UNHCR program officer explained. A report summarizing outcomes from 
a global community services/education workshop held later that year detailed 
that, “in response to an internal follow-up strategy to the ‘Machel Report,’ the 
UNHCR has established a Trust Fund to strategically reorient protection and 
programming for children and adolescents. For the first two years, this fund 
will support pilot projects to address critical protection concerns and promote 
peace.”66 Dadaab and Kakuma were to serve as the pilot sites for UNHCR’s Peace 
Education Program. 
In May of that year, two peace education officers were initially hired in the Branch 
Office to develop the program. “One was an education specialist, the other was a 
peace specialist,” a former UNHCR program officer recalled. “From the UNHCR’s 
standpoint, put the two together, you have ‘peace education.’ But the peace specialist 
had absolutely no field experience—didn’t last more than a month.” The peace 
education officer who remained spent several weeks in each camp, holding focus 
group interviews with a range of groups within the refugee community (e.g., 
women, elders, different clans and tribes) to discuss whether or not a peace 
education program should be implemented and, if so, how it might be structured: 
Over the course of those meetings, refugees would say that it’s 
not enough that our kids just learn this . . . we need to learn 
this for ourselves. In Kakuma, they would refer to the eight 
refugees who had died the previous year in clashes between 
Nuer and Dinka, and in Dadaab to the large number of women 
who reported being raped in the camp. So we developed a 
community program as well.
66  UNHCR, “Global Community Services/Education Workshop,” 33.
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It initially was thought that the school program would be implemented in the 
regular curriculum as part of civics or social studies. “However, we decided we 
needed to be able to call it PE [peace education] so kids knew what they were 
learning,” explained the peace education officer. “There was a subject called 
pastoral care and it was a single period once a week where kids did absolutely 
nothing. And so we said, ‘well, this is the best substitute for pastoral care you 
could get.’ And that’s where we wound up putting it.”
The school-based peace education program was comprised of a series of activities 
covering 14 concept areas arranged in a “spiral” curriculum, where new lessons built 
on those of the previous weeks. In each camp, 40 peace education teachers were 
hired and trained in “pedagogy that was really student-centered and experiential,” 
remarked a former program officer. “It didn’t require reading or writing but rather 
facilitation skills. Like the environmental education teacher training had done, 
this helped to improve the quality of instruction in the camp because teachers 
utilized these approaches in the other classes they taught.” In Dadaab, CARE 
placed peace education in the mid-morning on Thursday where pastoral care 
had previously been slotted. However, in Kakuma, Lutheran World Federation, 
the new implementing partner for education, relocated pastoral care to Monday 
morning during the first period. The peace education officer remarked that “it 
would seem as though [Lutheran World Federation] made a conscious effort to 
put peace education where it would be least effective. That was often when school 
assembly was held, so students would miss first period.” Nevertheless, 42,000 
students across the two camps participated in the program in the pilot year.67 
DISCUSSION
Since the founding of the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, several events 
have shaped the development and implementation of refugee education policy 
and programming. Many of these changes are described in the EiE and UNHCR 
literature as a means of explaining the myriad conceptual and practical constraints 
of refugee education. Asking why and how questions and representing the answers 
in narrative form fills an important gap in these literatures by revealing how, 
over time, UNHCR and INGO staff members and refugees navigated certain 
ideational and institutional constraints—or, rather, how they exercised agency 
to make positive changes to refugee education policies and programming within 
certain structural challenges. 
67  Margaret Sinclair, “Education Mission to Kenya March 8-15,” UNHCR, Program and Technical Support 
Section, 1997, 20.
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The narrative snapshot above offers several examples of why and how, between 
1992 and 1997, certain education policies and programs, rather than others, 
were developed and implemented. In those five years, staff members at UNHCR 
HQ developed and strengthened policy frameworks, strategies, and standards 
for refugee education in response to the expanse and protraction of armed 
conflict; revised job descriptions to include refugee education specifically; and 
further aligned education with UNHCR’s core mandate to “provide international 
protection to refugees”—all of this at the global level. UN and INGO staff 
members leveraged EFA to advocate for the inclusion of primary schooling in 
camps; at the same time, this constrained education programming, leaving 
large populations of refugee youth without access to secondary, vocational, or 
higher education. In Dadaab and Kakuma, students who were initially taught 
under trees by other refugees without any curriculum were eventually taught the 
Kenyan national curriculum in semi-permanent and, later, permanent school 
buildings. PTAs and school management committees made decisions regarding 
the curriculum and language of instruction and built school infrastructure. In 
Dadaab, refugee teachers went on strike, successfully, to increase their incentive 
wages. Supplemental education programming (i.e., peace education) was piloted 
in both camps because, following a report that helped make the case for education 
as protection in emergency situations, a UNHCR coordinator was able to access 
additional funds. Similar changes have continued to the present day. For example, 
by the late 1990s, secondary schools were established in both camps, largely due 
to refugees’ advocacy efforts, and many Kenyan national teachers were employed 
in camp schools (however, there is a considerable degree of tension between 
refugee teachers and Kenyan national teachers). Many current refugee teachers 
in Dadaab and Kakuma were former students who completed K-12 and even 
higher ed in the camp schools. 
Nevertheless, the challenges of refugee education have continued, in Dadaab 
and Kakuma and worldwide. These challenges include the limited number of 
personnel who are tasked with overseeing education programming at UNHCR or 
its implementing partners, the high number of children and youth who are out of 
school, a lack of textbooks, overcrowded classrooms, and high rates of attrition 
from lower primary to upper primary and from upper primary to secondary. 
Persistent questions remain regarding the purposes of refugee education and its 
relationship to durable solutions, including choices about curriculum and language 
of instruction. We might well ask why, beyond resource constraints, changes to 
refugee education policies and programs haven’t brought more significant change 
to these challenges. History allows us to ask and answer this question literally, 
rather than rhetorically. It might not seem surprising that there are persistent 
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challenges to refugee education despite multiple changes, but these challenges 
were not and are not inevitable. Indeed, this is one of the central revelations of 
history—that nothing is predetermined, that there are contingencies.68 
CONCLUSION
Making a historical turn in refugee education research allows scholars and 
practitioners to help map the car’s route while driving it. Little has been 
documented about the development and implementation of refugee education; 
it lives primarily in the memories of those who were part of it. Dadaab and 
Kakuma have rich education histories, as do countless other camps around the 
world. The more narratives we have of the history of education in different camps, 
the more we can understand why and how actors made the choices they did in 
moments of contingency, whether about curriculum or supplemental education 
programming, or in framing the purposes of education to justify its provisioning; 
why and how different actors in different camps made similar or different choices; 
and what different choices could lead to more substantive changes. Camps have 
and will continue to be established throughout the world and choices will be made 
about providing education services. While historical narratives cannot provide 
comprehensive answers to what choices should be made, they can show how 
individuals—community services and education officers and refugees—previously 
made decisions that were shaped by institutional and ideational constraints, used 
agency to loosen these constraints, and capitalized on opportunities for change. 
Stated differently, narratives can help us understand the present by focusing a 
more holistic lens on the past, and in so doing make it possible to go in a new 
or different direction in the future—something akin to driving forward with the 
help of the rearview mirror.
68  Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1954).
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